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Where the grantee is still free to rescind, a reconveyance in which
his grantee, the mortgagor, reassumes the mortgage debt has been held
to amount to a valid release of the prior agreement to assume the mort-
gage. Morstain v. Kircher, 19o Minn. 78, 250 N.W. 727 (I933).
In the principal case the court stated that the conveyance from Brickell
and Kirchhofer to Herrold alone did not amount to a rescission since
Herrold and his wife were the original grantors. Such a position can
hardly be justified if the wife joined in the conveyance merely for the
purpose of releasing her right of dower. Simply naming her as grantee
in the deed would give her an interest greater than that which she had
previously conveyed. If the court meant that the right of dower released
by the wife to the grantee must now be reconveyed to her, this could
only be done on the assumption that a third party may have the wife's
dower outstanding even though the fee is in her husband. The release
of the right of dower operates to extinguish and not to transfer an
interest. The releasee does not get an interest, but only the immunity
from the releasor asserting it. See Black v. Kuhlman, 30 Ohio St. 196
(1876). The right of dower cannot be separated from the principal
estate. In re Lingafelter, 104 C.C.A. 38, I81 Fed. 24 (191o), which
affirmed 8 Ohio L. Rep. 230 (1909). If it is correct to assume that
the wife merely released her right of dower it would seem from an
analysis of the effect of the release that the act of reconveyance to the
wife as required by the court would be of no legal significance.
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DUTY OF DRIVER OF SCHOOL Bus IN REGARD TO CHILDREN
WHO HAVE JusT LEFT THE CAR
Plaintiff's seven-year-old son and several other children alighted
from the school bus, which the defendant was driving, when it made
its usual stop across the road from his home. Whether the child went
to the front or rear of the bus in order to cross the road, was disputed
by the evidence; but when the bus started up again, the little boy was
run over. The driver had no actual knowledge of the child's proximity
to the bus; but, seeing other children going across the road and no one
in front of the bus, he believed they were all out of the way. The jury
found the defendant not negligent, and a judgment for the plaintiff was
sustiiined in the Court of Appeals. In the syllabus, however, it was laid
down as a matter of law that, "A driver of a school bus, in the exercise
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of due care is under no duty, before proceeding, to descend from his bus
and ascertain the whereabouts of the alighting children when he has no
knowledge of a child's proximity to the bus." Dickerhoof, Admr.,
Appellant v. Badr, Appellee, 54 Ohio App. 320, Ohio Bar, Vol. ix,
No. 51 (1936).
A carrier of passengers "is bound to exercise as high a degree of
care, skill, and diligence in receiving the passenger, conveying him to
his destination, and setting him down safely as the means of conveyance
employed and the circumstances of the case will permit." IO C.J. No.
1294. Expressions commonly used to describe the duty of the common
carrier are, "highest degree of care," "extraordinary care and caution,"
"extraordinary care and diligence," etc.
Although a school bus is not a common carrier, no lesser degree of
care is required of the driver. In Phillips v. Hardgrove et al, i61 Wash.
121, 296 Pac. 559 (1931), the question before the court was whether
the school district and the bus driver were required to exercise ordinary
care or the highest degree of care consistent with the practical operation
of the bus, which is required of carriers of passengers generally. The
court there said that, "if the rule of the highest degree of care arises,
as all the authorities say, from the nature of the employment and on
the grounds of public policy, there is no reason why it should not be
applied to a school district the same as any other passenger carrier.
Certainly, school children are entitled to the same degree of care as are
adults. * * * * The operator of the bus is also required to exercise
the highest degree of care."
What acts meet the requirement of the "highest degree of care"
depends upon the circumstances. In The Cleveland Railroad Co. v.
Sebesta et al, 121 Ohio St. 26, I66 N.E. 898, 29 Ohio L.R. 278, 7
Ohio Abs. 350 (1929), plaintiff, an adult, who was struck by an
automobile just as he stepped from a street car, was not allowed to
recover from the street car company because the motorman was under
no duty to do for the plaintiff the things he could do for himself. The
court indicated that the motorman might, however, have been under ai
greater duty if it were not for the fact that plaintiff was "apparently in
full possession of his faculties, physical as well as mental. He was neither
an aged or infirm person, nor was he a child, and no one noting his
actions as described by himself would be led to think that he needed or
desired any information or caution with respect to the manner in which
and the time at which he should leave the car." "'While the duty of
the carrier to all passengers is the same in degree, the amount of care
may vary with the age, sex, or bodily infirmity of the passenger, greater
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care being required, for example, in respect to children of tender years
,than is necessary for adults." 10 C.J. No. 1330.
Holding the driver of a school bus to the same degree of care as
the driver of an ordinary bus or a street car motorman does not,
therefore, mean that the precautionary measures required of each will
be identical. In effect, since all the passengers of the school bus are
children, the school bus driver is constantly under a greater duty than
is the operator of the ordinary common carrier. Not only because of
the youth of his passengers, but because they have no choice as to their
mode of transportation, the driver of a school bus occupies a different
relation to his passengers than does the driver of an ordinary common
carrier. Tipton v. Willey, 47 Ohio App. 236, I91 N.E. 804, 40 Ohio
L.R. 233 (1934). His duty to the child does not cease when the child
reaches a place of safety on the ground, but he must "use every reason-
able precaution and care for the safety of such children and to prevent
any harm or danger coming to them, either in approaching the bus, or
while riding in the bus, or when alighting from and leaving the immedi-
ate proximity of the bus at the completion of their journey, or at any
time during the journey." Burnett v. Allen, 114 Fla. 489, 154 So. 515
(934). Thus the care required of the school bus driver is in reality
not only greater than that required of the common carrier, because his
passengers are children, but, for the same reason, his duty lasts longer.
The common situation dealing with the duty of a school bus driver
to a child who has just left the bus is one involving an injury to the
child by a passing automobile. The questions in those cases is whether
the driver was negligent in not warning the child of the approaching
car or in allowing him to leave the bus at that particular time. Under
such circumstances, it has been uniformly held that the driver's negli-
gence is a question for the jury. Tipton v. Willey, supra; Sheffield v.
Loyering et al, 51 Ga. App. 353, 18o S.E. 523 (935); Machen-
heimer v. Falknor et al, 144 Wash. 27, 255 Pac. io3i (1927); Bur-
nett v. Allen, supra; Phillips v. Hardgrove et al, supra. "Whether a
person contracting and performing such a contract has used all such
reasonable care and caution is a question for the determination of the
jury in each case." Burnett v. Allen, supra. Phillips v. Hardgrove et al,
supra, was a suit against the bus driver, the school district, and the driver
of the automobile which struck the child. Judgment in the lower court
was in favor of the first two defendants, but the Supreme Court of
Washington held that both the school district and the operator of the
bus were required to exercise the highest degree of care, and a new trial
was granted because the court could not as a matter of law say that
under the circumstances those defendants were not guilty of negligence.
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In fact situations similar to that of the Dickerhoof case, but involving
common carriers, the question of negligence is invariably left to the jury.
In Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Crooks, 125 Ohio St. 28o, 181 N.E. lO2
(1932), a passenger alighting from a city bus was struck by a passing
automobile. A nonsuit on the pleadings was granted in the trial court
on the ground that the relationship of passenger and carrier had termi-
nated at the time of the injury. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that
this was error and affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the
railway company owed the passenger an antecedent duty to do nothing
that would tend to subject the passenger to any more than the usual
and ordinary perils of traffic, and that it was a question of fact for the
jury whether the railway company had created a condition that had
such a tendency. Other cases analogous to Dickerhoof v. Bair are those
in which a passenger who had just left a street car was struck by the
overhang of the car as it turned the corner. Whether the defendant
was negligent in starting the car before the plaintiff had an opportunity
to reach a place of safety was a question for the jury. White v. Con-
necticut Co., 88 Conn. 614, 9 2 Atl. 411, L.R.A. I915C, 6o9 (1914);
Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 182 Cal. 93, 187 Pac. 2
(1920); Niles v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 230 Mass. 316, 1 19 N.E.
752 (1918); Wilson v. International Ry. Co., 199 N.Y.S. 562, 205
App. Div. 275 (1923); Holm v. City of Seattle, 294 Pac. 261
(1930).
The main reliance of the plaintiff in the principal case was on Ziehm
v. Vale, 98 Ohio St. 306, 12o N.E. 702, I A.L.R. 1381 (1918), in
which it was held that, "Where an owner of an automobile, upon
returning to his car, finds an infant 4 2 years of age thereon, and twice
drives the infant from the car, the owner is not thereby absolved from
further duty towards such infant. Under such circumstances, when the
child still remains in close proximity to the car, the driver is required to
exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to the child." The fact that the
driver had knowledge of the child's proximity increased the driver's duty
in that case. In the principal case the driver did not know the child was
near the bus, but that fact alone should not be sufficient to relieve him
entirely of the great degree of care imposed upon him.
The result reached in the principal case was no doubt correct on
the facts in that case. But in laying down a definite rule as to the duty
of the school bus driver under the circumstances, the court went farther
than was either necessary in the particular case or justifiable by reason
of precedent. JENNY BRACE
